Abstract. Some extensions are considered of Gold's influential model of language learning by machine from positive data. Studied are criteria of successful learning featuring convergence in the limit to vacillation between several alternative correct grammars. The main theorem of this paper is that there are classes of languages that can be learned if convergence in the limit to up to (n + 1) exactly correct grammars is allowed but which cannot be learned if convergence in the limit is to no more than n grammars, where the no more than n grammars can each make finitely many mistakes. This contrasts sharply with results of Barzdin and Podnieks and, later, Case and Smith for learnability from both positive and negative data.
1. Introduction. In [46] Gold introduced his seminal model of language learning: Imagine, as pictured in (1.1) just below, a machine M being fed data about membership in a (formal) language L and, as a result, outputting over time a series of grammars p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p t , p t+1 , . . . conjectured to be for L:
For our present purposes, it will suffice to consider two kinds of data presentation and one kind of success from [46] . For expository convenience, and, as noted in section 2 below, without loss of generality, we can consider all languages L to be subsets of the set of nonnegative integers.
Data about L are either 1. informant, a listing of every nonnegative integer with a clear indication of whether or not it is in L, or 2. text, an arbitrary listing of all and only the elements of L. Gold took quite seriously, as a model of child language learning, the case of data presentation by arbitrary text, where M receives all and only positive information about L. Justification for this point of view can be found, for example, in [9, 13] , where it is noted from field work that children don't need corrections to learn language.
Regarding successful language learning, referring to (1.1) above: for Gold, machine M identifies language L def ⇔ M fed any text for L, outputs a corresponding sequence p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . such that, for some t, p t = p t+1 = p t+2 = · · · and p t is a correct grammar for L. In other words, M identifies L ⇔ on each text for L, the corresponding conjectures of M converge, in the limit, to some fixed final conjecture, and that final conjecture is correct. 2 Gold showed that no M so identifies the entire class of regular languages [48] , but some M does identify the class of finite languages. Angluin [1, 2] presents other classes L natural from the perspective of formal language theory such that some M identifies each language in L.
Many cognitive scientists seek to model all of cognition by computer program [77, 50] , and Gold's model of language learning from text (positive information) by machine has been very influential in contemporary theories of natural language and in mathematical work explicitly motivated by its possible connection to human language learning (see, for example, [76, 93, 94, 66, 68, 8, 44, 15, 69, 70, 38, 39, 53, 5] ).
In the present paper we consider some new criteria of success extending Gold's basic model above. Suppose that we fix an integer n > 0. Consider the following criterion of success (again based on (1.1) above). We say that M TxtFex n -identifies L def ⇔ M, on any text for L, outputs corresponding conjectures p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . such that there is a t for which 1. the sequence p t , p t+1 , p t+2 , . . . contains at most n distinct grammars, and 2. each of the grammars p t , p t+1 , p t+2 , . . . is correct. Of course, Gold's identification criterion above is just TxtFex 1 -identification. It is well known [82] that equivalent grammars (e.g., p t , p t+1 , p t+2 , . . . as above) can be so different from one another that in some cases it is not possible to prove in ZermeloFrankel set theory [49] that they are equivalent. This suggests that a suitably clever M might be able to TxtFex n+1 -identify a larger class of languages than any machine, however clever, could TxtFex n -identify. Unfortunately, it was already known [12] that, at least in the case where the data are informant instead of text, one gets no more learning power with (n + 1) correct programs in the limit than with n. Surprisingly, then, the main theorem of the present paper (Theorem 3.3 in section 3 below) implies that, nonetheless, for learning from text, larger classes of languages can be learned with up to (n + 1) correct programs in the limit than with up to n. Theorem 3.3 suggests, then, the possibility that evolutionary pressure for increased learning power may have resulted in human language learning strategies that involve convergence to vacillating between n > 1 correct grammars in the limit. This is examined more critically in section 7 below. Regarding, though, the size of n, we note that at least one of n distinct grammars would have to be of size proportional to the size of n (i.e., to log n); hence, for extraordinarily large n, at least one of n distinct grammars would be too large to fit in our heads-unless, as seems unlikely, human storage mechanisms admit infinite regress. Osherson and Weinstein [71] introduced the case where the number of final grammars is finite but unbounded, and independently [28, 71] (see also [72] ) introduced the case where the number of final grammars is infinite (TxtBc-identification). We briefly introduced the case, discussed above, of up to n final grammars in [15] .
The proof of Theorem 3.3 employs an (n+1)-ary self-reference argument [18] , and an informal thesis is presented and discussed after the statement of Theorem 3.3 that self-referential examples witnessing an existence theorem portend natural examples witnessing that theorem.
Case and Lynes [28] considered, among other things, the learning of grammars for languages where a single final grammar is allowed to have a bounded number of mistakes (anomalies). The mistakes are about which objects are (and which are not) in the corresponding language. In [30, 31, 15] there are discussion, motivation, and interpretation of results about inferring anomalous programs for functions. The results in [30, 31, 15] and in this paper show that allowing anomalies increases learning power. Clearly, anomalous programs are tolerable provided the number of anomalies is small. Hence, it is plausible that people have evolved language learning strategies that exploit the greater learning power achieved by converging to slightly incorrect grammars. Theorem 3.3 says, more generally than indicated above, that for each n > 0 some classes of languages can be algorithmically learned (in the limit) by converging to up to n + 1 different, exactly correct grammars; but these classes cannot be learned by converging (in the limit) to up to n different grammars, where the up to n grammars are each allowed to have a finite number of anomalies Corollary 3.7 below specifies a two-dimensional hierarchy involving TxtFex a bidentification: learning up to b final grammars each with up to a mistakes. Theorem 3.11 implies that, in passing from learning finitely many anomalous grammars in the limit to learning infinitely many, one can eliminate half of the anomalies, and that's optimal! Intuitively, since (with positive data only) one is missing approximately half of the information, one can eliminate half of the anomalies only.
If L is a nonempty language, then some texts for L are noncomputable sequences, but in a completely computable universe, no parents can generate a noncomputable sequence of data for their children. Hence, it is interesting to consider RecTxtFex a bidentification, which is similar to TxtFex a b -identification except that success is required only on computable presentations of positive data, on all recursive texts. It might be expected that a suitably clever machine M might be able to exploit the recursiveness of texts to learn larger classes of languages than any machine required to succeed on arbitrary texts, but Corollary 3.1 below implies that this is not the case (generalizing the b = 1 case essentially from [96, 3] ). We say, then, that the restriction to recursive texts is circumvented.
Angluin, in her seminal paper [1] , presents a severe constraint on TxtFex 1 -identification of classes of languages: the subset principle. Basically, she shows that if M TxtFex 1 -identifies a class of languages L, then for each L ∈ L there is a finite set D (called a tell tale) contained in L such that D is not contained in any proper sublanguage of L in L. Intuitively, this necessary condition prevents overgeneralization in learning from positive data [1, 8] . Theorem 4.4 below generalizes the subset principle to the criteria of success TxtFex a b -identification and TxtBc a -identification, where the a in TxtBc a -identification allows each of the infinitely many final grammars converged to have up to a anomalies. Theorem 4.4 is also used to prove Theorem 3.11 below.
A child learning a language may or may not be sensitive to the order or timing of presentation of positive data. For TxtFex a b -identification (and variants thereof) we mathematically consider several kinds of insensitivity of a machine M to data order:
1. set-driven: M's output at any point depends only on the set of positive data it's seen up to that point (not on the sequence in which it was presented). 2. partly set-driven: M's output at any point depends only on the set of positive data it's seen up to that point and on the length of the sequence in which it was presented. 3. b-ary order independent: for languages L on which for some text M converges to a finite set of final grammars, M converges to the same set (of cardinality ≤ b) of final grammars for each text for L. 4. weakly b-ary order independent: for languages L on which for some text M converges to a finite set of final grammars, there is a finite set of grammars D (of cardinality ≤ b) such that M converges to a subset of this D for each text for L. In section 5 below, we prove several theorems, each witnessing that, for suitably clever M's simultaneously exhibiting some insensitivities as above and circumventing the restriction to recursive texts, there is no loss of learning power (with respect to TxtFex a b -identification or the variants thereof). For example, Theorem 5.5 implies that the power of TxtFex a b -identification is unaffected by the restriction to M's which are simultaneously partly set-driven and weakly b-ary order independent and which circumvent the restriction to recursive texts. Theorem 5.5 is the hardest theorem herein to prove, and the other theorems in section 5 are proved by modifications and/or simplifications of the proof of Theorem 5.5. Some of the theorems in section 5 generalize predecessors for TxtFex 0 1 -identification [3, 93, 90, 38, 70, 39] but are much harder to prove. Some of the theorems in section 5 are applied in the present paper and in other papers.
In section 7 we discuss briefly computable universe hypotheses, present some critical discussion as promised above, and sketch some areas for future investigation.
Preliminaries.
We now proceed more formally. N denotes the set of natural numbers, { 0, 1, 2, . . . }. ϕ denotes a fixed acceptable programming system for the partial computable functions: N → N [81, 65, 79, 80, 83] . ϕ p denotes the partial computable function computed by the program (with code number) p in the ϕ-system. 3 Thanks to the device of Gödel or code numbering [82] we can treat languages over any finite alphabet as subsets of N. W p def = the domain of ϕ p , the r.e. language (⊆ N) recognized (or enumerated) by program (grammar) p in the ϕ-system [82] . Definition 2.1. A language learning function is a computable mapping from finite sequences, of natural numbers and #'s, into (Gödel numbers of) programs (grammars) in the ϕ-system. E denotes the class of all r.e. languages (⊆ N). Definition 2.2. A text for a language L is a mapping T from N into (N ∪ {#}) such that L is the set of natural numbers in the range of T . T is said to be for L ⇔ T is a text for L. The content of a sequence, of natural numbers and #'s, is the set of natural numbers in its range; content(·) denotes the content of its argument.
Intuitively, one can think of a text for a language as an enumeration of the objects in the language with the #'s representing pauses in the listing of such objects. For example, the only text for the empty language is just an infinite sequence of #'s.
Intuitively, if F is a learning function and σ is a finite initial segment of a text for a language L, then F(σ) represents F's conjecture as to a grammar for L based on the data about L in σ.
Variables σ and τ (with or without decorations 4 ) range over finite initial segments of texts T . σ denotes the length of σ. σ ⋄ σ ′ denotes the sequence formed by adding σ ′ to the end of σ.
+ denotes the set of positive integers. We take a and c to range over (N ∪ { * }) and b and d to range over (I + ∪ { * }). Intuitively, * denotes the unbounded but finite. For example, "card(D) ≤ * " means that D is finite. We adopt the convention that (∀i ∈ N )[i < * < ∞]. ∆ is the symmetric difference operator for sets/languages.
denotes "is a proper subset of," and "⊃" denotes "is a proper superset of." Set theoretically, as in [47] , we treat sequences as functions, and, in general, functions, finite, partial, or total, as single-valued sets of ordered pairs.
5 Hence, we can and do meaningfully compare them with "⊆," "⊂," "⊇," and "⊃." It follows, for example, that, if T is a text, "τ ⊂ T " means that "the finite sequence τ is an initial segment of the infinite sequence T ."
The quantifier "∃ ∞ τ " means "there exists infinitely many τ ." We use "|" to mean "such that." Definition 2.3. Suppose F is a learning function and T is a text. We say F(T ) converges (written:
In TxtFex a b -identification the b is a "bound" on the number of final grammars and the a a "bound" on the number of anomalies allowed in these final grammars. As above, a "bound" of * just means unbounded but finite. Intuitively, L ∈ TxtFex a b ⇔ there is an algorithm p, computing a learning function F, such that, if p is given any listing T of any language L ∈ L , it outputs a sequence of grammars converging in a nonempty set, F(T ), of no more than b grammars, and each of these grammars makes no more than a mistakes in generating L, i.e., if p is given any listing of any language L ∈ L , it outputs a sequence of grammars, and, past some point in this sequence, each grammar seen (over and over) is from a set of no more than b grammars and each of these "final" grammars makes no more than a mistakes in generating L.
TxtFex 0 1 -identification is equivalent to Gold's [46] seminal notion of identification, also referred to as TXTEX-identification in [28] and (indirectly) as INT in [72, 71, 70] . TxtFex a 1 -identification is just TXTEX a -identification from [28] . For n > 0, TxtFex 0 n -identification is just our notion of TXTFEX n -identification from [15] . Osherson and Weinstein [71] were the first to define TxtFex 0 * and TxtFex * * ; they called them BEXT and BFEXT, respectively.
It is common in the literature to use TXTEX ; the former is a bound on the number of different programs an associated machine eventually vacillates between in the limit; the latter is a bound on mind changes for convergence to a single final program.
, is computable.
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Learning power under TxtFex a b -identification might be affected if one requires success only on all recursive texts for a language. This is interesting since, for example, if the universe is completely algorithmic, then all real language texts generated by parents for their children are recursive! 
h in Definition 2.9 plays the role of a computable amount by which the final programs can be larger than minimal size. This size restriction of course does not hold in general, and, for TxtMfex 0 1 -identification, it is not as severe as requiring that the final program be strictly minimal size. Mathematically, TxtMfex a b -identification is well behaved, e.g., it turns out not to depend on the choice of acceptable system; it also does not depend on the choice of Blum program size measure [11] (by his recursive-relatedness result in [11] ). The lack of dependence on the choice of acceptable system is in contrast with the variant of TxtMfex 0 1 -identification in which we require h to be the identity function (see [23] ). The study of learning nearly minimal size programs began with [35] in the context of learning programs for functions (see also [52, 19, 20, 37] Next, for mathematical completeness and interest, we introduce the cases of success criteria for which the number of final grammars is possibly infinite, not necessarily finite as it is for TxtFex a b -identification. Definitions 2.11 and 2.12 are from [28] . The a ∈ { 0, * } cases were independently introduced in [71, 72] .
The quantifier "∀ ∞ k" means "for all but finitely many k ∈ N."
Definition 2.12. TxtBc a denotes the class of all classes L of languages such that some learning function TxtBc a -identifies each language in L. ∅ denotes the empty set of natural numbers. Fix canonical indexings of the finite sets of natural numbers and of the finite initial segments of texts each one to one onto N [82, 65] . 8 In the following, finite sets and segments are sometimes identified with their corresponding canonical indices. Hence, a reference to a least finite set or segment really refers to a finite set or segment with least canonical index. Also, when we compare finite sets or segments by <, ≤, · · · we are comparing their corresponding canonical indices.
·, · denotes a fixed pairing function [82] , a computable, surjective, and injective mapping from N × N into N.
For A ⊆ N, A denotes (N − A), the complement of A.
We let F (with or without decorations) range over learning functions.
Results on vacillation in learning.
This section presents our main results regarding the vacillatory learning criteria of the present paper.
In this section we defer proofs of three results until we have the benefit of some of the concepts and results from sections 4 and 5 below. Section 6 contains the three deferred proofs.
The definition of TxtFex a b -identification (Definition 2.5 above) requires success for each order of data presentation. For each nonempty r.e. language, there are continuum many such orders (texts) [47] yet only countably many recursive ones (since there are only countably many Turing machine programs for computing the recursive texts [82] ). In a completely computable universe (which ours might be), there are really only recursive texts available to be presented to learning machines. Of course the universe may be such that, while all the language learners are computable, there are some noncomputable phenomena too. As noted in [70] , since the utterances of children's caretakers depend heavily on external environmental events, such influences might introduce a random component into naturally occurring texts. It is, then, interesting and important to compare learning power where success is required on all texts with the cases where it is required only on all recursive texts.
Wiehagen [96] essentially notes that RecTxtFex 0 1 = TxtFex 0 1 (a related result was first proved in [3] ), and [28] essentially observes that (∀a)[RecTxtFex
. We have, more generally, the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.1.
Hence, for all the vacillatory learning criteria of the present paper, it makes no difference in learning power whether or not we restrict the texts to be recursive! By contrast, for TxtBc a , learning procedures can exploit the assumption that they are receiving recursive texts; for TxtBc a , the restriction to recursive text does make a difference in learning power [28, 36] .
The topic of learning nearly minimal size programs/grammars is treated in greater depth in [23] . Herein we present results about such criteria only in the contexts of recursive text (Corollary 3.1) and of restrictions on learning functions (section 5 below). There is a small amount of additional discussion below in section 7.
RecTxtFex 
well-known r.e., nonrecursive set [82] . Suppose k is a recursive function with range
It is easy to see that
and that
Next is our main theorem. It says that, for each n > 0, some classes of languages can be algorithmically learned (in the limit) by converging to up to n + 1 different, exactly correct grammars; however, these classes cannot be learned by converging (in the limit) to up to n different grammars, where the up to n grammars are each allowed to have a finite number of anomalies! Allowing one more grammar in the limit makes a big difference in learning power.
Hence, it is possible that, for some n > 0, people have evolved language learning strategies that exploit the greater learning power achieved by converging in the limit to up to n + 1 rather than to up to n grammars (see a critical discussion in section 7 below).
The detailed proof of Theorem 3.3 is deferred to section 6 since it depends, in part, on Definitions 5.1 and 5.4 and Theorem 5.6 in section 5.
The reader may note that the languages in the class L n+1 from Theorem 3.3 have an intriguing self-referential character. It is useful to discuss this feature a bit in the interest of anticipating and answering a possible objection to the use of self-reference in witnessing the separation result of Theorem 3.3.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3, to handle the self-referential character of L n+1 , we employ the (n + 1)-ary recursion theorem, a folk theorem generalizing the Kleene recursion theorem [82, p. 214 ] and the Smullyan double recursion theorem [87] ; it is also a consequence of our operator recursion theorem [14] , an infinitary analogue of the finitary recursion theorems.
Intuitively, the (n + 1)-ary recursion theorem provides a means for transforming any sequence of n + 1 programs p 0 , . . . , p n into a corresponding sequence of programs e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) such that each e(p i ) first creates quiescent copies of e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) (including a self-copy, a copy of e(p i ) itself), and then each e(p i ) runs p i on the quiescent copies of e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) any together with any externally given input. Each e(p i ), in effect, has complete (low level) knowledge of e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) (including self-knowledge, knowledge of e(p i ) itself), and p i represents how e(p i ) uses its selfknowledge, its knowledge of the other e(p j )'s, and its knowledge of the external world. Infinite regress is not required since each e(p i ) creates the copies of e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) externally to itself. One mechanism to achieve this creation is a generalization of the self-replication trick isomorphic to that employed by single-celled organisms [14] . Another is for the programs e(p 0 ), . . . , e(p n ) to look in a common mirror to see which programs they are. Reference [18] provides a tutorial on thinking about and applying recursion theorems.
10 Herein, our application of the (n + 1)-ary recursion theorem (to prove Theorem 3.3) will be informal and the sequence p 0 , . . . , p n will be implicit. Now for the possible objection: On the one hand, we argue above that Theorem 3.3 suggests a possibility regarding human language learning; on the other hand, we prove it by self/other reference, and it is common to regard self-referential examples as unnatural. For example, Gödel proved his famous incompleteness theorem by a self-reference argument [45, 62] , and his self-referential sentence providing an unprovable truth of, for example, First Order Peano Arithmetic (FOPA) is not natural-no number or combinatorial theorist would care whether it was true or false.
We answer this objection about self-referential proofs of existence theorems with the following.
Informal Thesis 1. If a self-referential example witnesses the existence of a phenomenon, there are natural examples witnessing same! For this informal thesis we present a brief plausibility argument and one piece of empirical evidence. Plausibility: Self-reference arguments lay bare an underlying simplest reason for the theorems they prove [82, 18] ; if a theorem is true for such a simple reason, the "space" of reasons for its truth may be broad enough to admit natural examples. Empirical: Although Gödel proved his famous first incompleteness theorem by a self-reference argument, many years afterwards, Paris and Harrington [75] and later Friedman [84, 85] found quite natural examples of combinatorial truths of first order arithmetic not provable in FOPA.
11 In fairness, regarding the above informal thesis, we note, for example, that the Blum speed-up theorem [10] was originally proved by a self-reference argument, 12 but natural witnesses to even exponential speed-up have not (yet) been found. However, even the self-reference proofs of this result are fairly complicated; hence, one might expect that natural examples are especially hard to find.
For some theoretical work instigated by Barzdin and dealing, in part, with eliminating dependence on self-referential examples, see Fulk's work on robust function learning in [40] . Reference [70] contains a recursion theorem proof of the immediately preceding corollary based on the proof in [71] , but the same combinatorial difficulties occur in attempting to generalize this proof. We sought a combinatorially cleaner self-reference proof. A later conversation about this with Royer led to Royer and Kurtz supplying us with essentially the self-referential sets we use in Theorem 3.3 above. We believe their self-referential examples are somewhat simpler than those we had been working with. They also supplied some of the crucial combinatorics for the diagonal argument that goes with a special case.
It is interesting to note that if one modifies the definition of TxtFex a n -identification to require that the learning function must converge to exactly n grammars, then the hierarchy of Corollary 3.4 above collapses.
13
If we restrict our attention to languages which are the (pairing function coded) graphs of total functions, then it is essentially shown (the a = 0 case in [12] and the a > 0 cases in [31] ) that the hierarchy again collapses. Hence, in the case of "scientific inference," i.e., the case of learning programs for computable functions, there is no power in vacillation.
14 Therefore, Corollary 3.4 is very sensitive to minor perturbations. We should men-11 See [78] for an example from complexity theory. 12 See also Young's version in [98] and our operator recursion theorem variant in [86] . 13 Just output every nth grammar. 14 For computable functions f , one can think of input x as coding a scientific experiment and the output f (x) as coding the corresponding experimental result. In this way results about learning programs for functions can be interpreted as results about finding predictive explanations for phenomena-as results about scientific induction. For more on this see [3, 31, 22, 7, 21, 56] . Regarding the names of the learning criteria studied in the present paper, originally [31] "Ex" stood for "explanatory," "Fex" stood for "finitely explanatory," and Bc for "behaviorally correct." tion, however, that there are some interesting effects on learning power for vacillatory function learning wrought by bounding suitably sensitive measures of the computational complexity of the learning functions themselves [24] and by the introduction of noisy input data [25] .
The next proposition provides a dual to Theorem 3.3. There are classes which can be learned with one program in the limit and with up to m + 1 anomalies in that program which cannot be learned with finitely many programs in the limit, but with each having no more than m anomalies. Proposition 3.6. (TxtFex
. Also, L ∈ TxtFex m * together with Theorems 2.6 and 2.9 from [31] yields a contradiction.
In [4] it is shown that { L | L = m+1 N } also witnesses the separation of Proposition 3.6.
Clearly, from Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.6 we have our main corollary.
In Corollary 3.7, we see that all and only the obvious inclusions hold. Hence, allowing more anomalies, final grammars, or both enhances learning power, but anomalies and final grammars cannot in general completely substitute for one another. For example, TxtFex 0 2 is incomparable to TxtFex 1 1 . That is, there are classes which can be learned with no mistakes and up to two final grammars which cannot be learned with up to one mistake and one final grammar, and there are other classes which can be learned with up to one mistake and one final grammar which cannot be learned with no mistakes and up to two final grammars.
Corollary 3.8 (Case and Lynes [28] ). TxtFex allowing infinitely many grammars in the limit is not so realistic for modeling language learning but, nonetheless, it is mathematically interesting to make the comparisons. Proposition 3.10. TxtBc 0 − TxtFex * * = ∅. Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.6, we identify total functions f with
. Also, L ∈ TxtFex * * together with Theorems 2.12 and 3.1 from [31] yields a contradiction.
Remark 1. Proposition 3.10 still holds even if we restrict TxtBc 0 -identification to recursive texts.
The next theorem says that, in passing from learning finitely many anomalous grammars in the limit to learning infinitely many, one can eliminate half of the anomalies, and that's optimal! This contrasts with the function learning case [31] , where, by a result of Steel, one can so eliminate all of finitely many anomalies. Intuitively, in the present context, since one is missing in the input data the negative information, i.e., since one is missing approximately half the information, one can eliminate only half of the anomalies.
Theorem 3.11. TxtFex
− TxtBc m ). In Theorem 3.11 we see that some excluded inclusions are, at first glance, unexpected. Its proof is deferred to section 6 since it depends on Theorem 4.4 in section 4 below.
Clearly, we have the following corollary. Corollary 3.12 (see [28] ). The class of cofinite sets is in
We have not yet worked out all the relationships analogous to those in Theorem 3.11 and Corollary 3.12 for the cases in which TxtBc a -identification is restricted to recursive texts. As noted above in this section, the restriction to recursive texts does affect TxtBc a -identification [28, 36] .
4. Topological results. We next present several useful results which can be described as topological. The exact connections to topology (actually, to Baire category theory and Banach-Mazur games [49]) we will not pursue herein, but on that subject the interested reader can consult [67, 70] .
Definition 4.1. Suppose that σ ⊆ τ ⊂ T, with T a text. Then
Suppose that σ is a finite initial segment of a text T . Picture F being fed T one element at a time and imagine watching the successive corresponding output programs. Then, for example, from Definition 4.1 immediately above, F[σ, T ] is the set of all these output programs one sees from the time F is fed all of σ.
Just below is a variant of a fundamental lemma from [71] convenient for this paper. An original, not-so-general version of this lemma is from [3] (see also [67, 70] ). Variations on its proof will appear in other proofs.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose L ∈ E. Suppose that, for each text T for L, an arbitrary σ T ⊂ T is chosen. Then, for these choices, let
Proof. Suppose the hypotheses. Suppose for contradiction the negation of (4.1). Hence,
Let T be a fixed text for L. We recursively define another text T ′ for L as follows. Let τ 0 = σ and τ ′ 0 = τ 0 ⋄T (0). Suppose (recursively) that τ n and τ ′ n ⊃ σ are defined and in L. By (4.2) we may take τ n+1 to be the least ⊇ τ
The I = Fex 0 1 case of the following theorem is from [1] . She calls the finite sets D featured tell tales. The theorem witnesses a severe constraint called the subset principle on learning from positive data. See [1, 8] regarding the importance of the subset property for avoidance of overgeneralization in learning languages from positive data. See [54, 95] for discussion regarding the possible connection between this subset principle and a more traditionally linguistically oriented one in [64] .
We let 2 * def = * .
It would be interesting to have a complete characterization from Theorem 4.4. Some progress was made in [6] , where it is essentially shown that, for any uniformly decidable class of recursive languages L, a learning function F witnesses that L is in TxtBc a ⇔ each L ∈ L satisfies (4.3) above.
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To prove Theorem 4.4 it is useful to have the following combinatorial lemma whose proof is omitted by reason of being straightforward.
Lemma 4.5.
Hence, by Lemma 4.3,
Hence, (∀τ
Clearly, in the proof of Theorem 4.4 there is no use of the computability of F. The limitation Theorem 4.4 witnesses on learning from texts is purely topological having nothing to do with algorithmicity. Corollary 4.6 and the nonlearnability half of Theorem 3.11 above, proved from Theorem 4.4, likewise do not depend on algorithmicity. 15 This complements a related characterization in [1] of the uniformly decidable classes of recursive languages in TxtFex 0 1 . Reference [6] also provides a related characterization of the uniformly decidable classes of recursive languages in TxtFex * 1 . References [63, 57] contain characterizations of uniformly decidable classes of recursive languages in important special cases of TxtFex 0 1 , and [26] contains characterizations of language learning with noisy texts.
16 τ is, then, what is suggestively called a locking sequence [70] .
Corollary 4.6 (see [71, 28] ). Suppose that L contains an infinite language L and all its finite sublanguages. Then L ∈ TxtBc * . Hence, the class of regular languages ∈ TxtBc * . Theorem 4.4 does not imply that if a learning function TxtFex 0 1 -identifies an infinite language, it must fail to TxtFex 0 1 -identify each proper sublanguage. In fact we have the following proposition, a variant of which, regarding function learning, appears in [18] .
Proposition 4.7. There is in TxtFex 0 1 an infinite r.e. collection of infinite languages of the form { W e0 ⊃ W e1 ⊃ W e2 ⊃ · · · }.
Proof. By the operator recursion theorem [14] , there is an infinite r.e. sequence of self-other referential programs e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . such that, for each i ∈ N, W ei = { e i , e i+1 , e i+2 , . . . }.
We omit the straightforward verification.
Gold [46] proved Corollary 4.6 with TxtFex 0 1 in place of TxtBc * and was clearly concerned that his result meant that only rather puny language classes could be learned from positive data. However, Wiehagen [96] presents a class of r.e. languages in TxtFex Suppose that N is a class of natural languages learnable from text and which contains some language L and also an infinitely different natural sublanguage L ′ of L. For example, L ′ might be the class of imperative sentences of L. Theorem 4.4 above causes no apparent problem since a finite tell-tale D for L need not (and should not) be contained in L ′ . It may be useful for linguists to try to find such tell-tale D's for natural languages L. Of course such a D shouldn't be contained in, for example, L ′ , the set of imperative sentences of L, but should nonetheless be salient empirically to the learning of L.
The following stability property is useful for studying the criteria RecTxtFex
The following lemma, which is useful to this paper, combines the topological with the algorithmic. It generalizes predecessors from [3, 38, 70] .
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that L is r.e. and recursively b-stabilizes F. Then
Proof. Suppose the hypothesis on L and, for contradiction, the negation of (4.5). Hence, . By (4.6) we may algorithmically find a τ n+1 ⊇ τ
Clearly, T ′ is a recursive text for L and T ′ = n∈N τ n too, with τ 0 ⊂ τ 1 ⊂ τ 2 ⊂ · · · . By the choice of τ n 's, for each n ∈ N, F(τ n+1 ) ∈ D n . Therefore, F(T ′ ) ⇓ to a set of cardinality ≤ b, a contradiction to the hypothesis on L.
Insensitive or restricted learning functions.
It is interesting to ask whether or not child language learning exhibits sensitivity to the order or the timing of presentation of data. We consider herein some mathematical versions of this question. Several mathematical definitions have been given for various different notions of insensitivity to order, essentially for the case of TxtFex We extend these definitions of insensitive or restricted learning functions naturally to the context of the vacillatory learning criteria of the present paper, 17 and we investigate the interesting mathematical questions of whether learning functions with these insensitivities or restrictions thereby lose learning power. Answering many of these questions for the vacillatory criteria is much more difficult than for the TxtFex 0 1 case.
18
As noted above, we also apply some of our results in this section to help us prove results in this and other papers.
Reference [93] essentially notes that set-driven learning functions are insensitive to time (unlike text learnability). The next defined restriction in effect provides some degree of sensitivity to timing. Definition 5.2 (Schäfer [90, 70] , Fulk [38, 39] ). F is called partly set-driven (synonym [38, 39] 
Intuitively, F is set-driven (respectively, partly set-driven) iff, for each σ, F(σ) depends only on the content of σ (respectively, depends only on the length and content of σ).
First Schäfer [90, 70] and later Fulk [38, 39] independently showed that set-driven learning functions can't TxtFex 0 1 -identify some classes of languages that unrestricted learning functions can, but partly set-driven learning functions do not restrict learning power with respect to TxtFex 0 1 -identification. Fulk additionally showed that set-driven learning functions can't even TxtBc 0 -identify some language classes in TxtFex 0 1 . He interprets the difference in power between set-driven and partly setdriven learning functions as witnessing the need for time greater than the size of the content of the input to "think" about the input.
Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein [70] observed that the power of TxtFex 0 1 -identification on infinite r.e. languages is not limited by set-driveness.
The following definition presents a convenient term paralleling that from Definition 4.8.
While identification of a language L requires identification for each order of presentation of (text for) L, the final (correct) grammar(s) converged to may be different for different texts. As noted in [70] , this would seem to be a source of strength, since for a learning machine's forcing the final grammars to be the same for each text might involve its (algorithmically) recognizing grammar equivalence, i.e., recognizing { x, y | W x = W y }, but as is well known [82] , this set is not algorithmically recognizable (r.e.) (nor is its complement).
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Order independent machines are insensitive to which text is used for L in that their final grammars depend only on L, not on the order of presentation. Their grammars along the way can, of course, depend on the text.
If, for some n > 0 and for some a, humans TxtFex a n+1 -identify a language L but do not TxtFex a n -identify it, it is interesting whether, nonetheless, some environments and corresponding texts for L cause them to output fewer final conjectures than n + 1. There is a corresponding and ostensibly weaker notion of order independence in which, for each text, the set of final grammars converged to is always contained in (but not necessarily equal to) some finite set of final grammars.
These order independence notions clearly capture a very different kind of insensitivity to order of data presentation than the set-driven notions above. 20 The formal definition for our order independence notions immediately follows.
Definition 5.4.
1.
We call a learning function,
Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein [70] , adapting a related result of L. Blum and M. Blum [3] , essentially show that order independent learning functions can TxtFex case only; however, the lift to Theorem 5.5 ostensibly requires a much more difficult proof.
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For nontrivially vacillatory criteria, it is open whether (full) order independence can be combined with partly set-driven without loss of learning power.
Theorem 5.5's proof is the most difficult of the present paper. Fortunately, the other proofs of theorems in this section are modifications and/or simplifications of the proof of Theorem 5.5. 19 In fact, more importantly, since this set is Π 0 2 -complete [82] , it is not even algorithmically recognizable by a limiting [88] or mind-changing procedure (but its complement is). 20 One can think of them as global and the set-driven notions as local. 21 In the present paper we do not consider the restriction to so-called prudence [70] , a primary concern of [39] . Prudent learning functions are those which never conjecture a grammar p without being able to learn Wp. On that subject the interested reader may also wish to consult [51, 55] .
Theorem 5.5. There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) a learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function F ′ such that 1. F ′ is both partly set-driven and weakly b-ary order independent, and
Suppose that pad is a one-to-one computable function such that (∀n, p) [W pad(p,n) = W p ] [65, 83] . Intuitively, pad(p, 0), pad(p, 1), pad(p, 2) , . . . are just padded variants of program p which have the same recognizing behavior as p but which differ from one another syntactically.
Suppose F and b are given. Define F ′ on τ thus. Set n = τ and A = content(τ ). ( * In the definition of F ′ (τ ) the only dependence on τ will be on n and A to make sure F ′ is partly set-driven. * ) Search for the least D 1 , σ 1 such that
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( * Clearly, such a D 1 , σ 1 will always exist since σ 1 may be chosen big enough not to be contained in any σ ′ ≤ n. * ) ( * Suppose τ in L. Clause 3 provides a bounded (by n) approximation to
do ( * Pump down from D i and ratchet up from σ i , preserving apparent stability. * ) increment i by 1; [38, 39] and serves below in the proof of F ′ 's weak b-ary order independence in a combinatorially similar role. 22 It is useful to recall here that, from section 2, ·, · is a numerical pairing function and that we identify finite sets and initial segments of texts with their corresponding canonical indices (numbers). The word least, then, refers to least numerical value. 23 Again, it is useful to recall that, from section 2, we identify finite initial segments of texts with their corresponding canonical indices (numbers). Hence, in the inequality, "σ ′ ≤ n, " we are treating σ as its numerical canonical index.
24 N.B.: It is useful to recall here that, from section 2 above, "⊂" denotes "is a proper subset of," and " ⊃ " denotes "is a proper superset of." 25 Intuitively, it helps make weak b-ary order independence true by preventing, for many r.e. languages L, the presence of some text for L that stabilizes F ′ .
Here's an intuitive way to think about this construction. Imagine a chimpanzee given an infinite collection of different kinds of sticks, some of which can be joined together to make longer sticks. Each stick points overhead in a particular direction with respect to the vertical. Above the chimp, but out of its sight, is a bunch of bananas it would like to knock down with a suitably large joined-together stick pointing in just the right direction to hit the bananas. However, it can't tell when it has actually reached the bunch of bananas even though it does reach them (so the poor thing never knows when it has succeeded and it never actually gets to eat the bananas). All it can tell is that some time after any choice of a (leaning) tower of sticks is not pointing quite right, one of the sticks will explode, knocking down all of the sticks above it, and it has to try again. The exploding sticks are quite like the injuries in a recursion-theoretic priority argument [88] .
The sticks correspond to the σ's, and one should think of them as initial segments of branches in an infinite-branching, upward-pointing tree similar to the finitebranching (rightward pointing) tree in [82, p. 157] . For each input τ to F ′ , when the while loop finishes, it provides some sequence of successively longer joined together sticks σ 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ σ m , with m the final value of i. A larger input to F ′ , τ ′ ⊃ τ , may result in a different sequence of sticks, σ 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ σ m ′ , from the while loop. The stick that exploded is the σ i with least i such that σ i = σ i . "Success" for the chimpanzee is described by Claim 1 below. We continue this discussion after the statement of that claim. Claim 1. If L recursively b-stabilizes F, then, for each text T for L, there is a maximum j ≥ 1 such that the algorithm for F ′ above on T eventually has stable values for
, values that are the same for (the algorithm for) F ′ 's calculation of F ′ (τ ) for all but finitely many τ ⊂ T. This j will also be ≤ b. Furthermore, if there is such a maximum j for some text for L, values of this maximum j and associated stable values of D 1 , σ 1 , . . . , D j , σ j will be independent of the choice of text for L.
Continued discussion. If L recursively b-stabilizes F and T is a text for L, then this claim does not imply that, for all but finitely many τ ⊂ T , the while loop on input τ stops with the same D 1 , σ 1 , . . . , D j , σ j -only that the while loop stops with D 1 , σ 1 , . . . , D i , σ i , for some i ≥ j. Success for the chimpanzee discussed above is the stabilization on σ 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ σ j , but even after this stability is reached, any sticks returned by the while loop, σ i , for i > j, will "explode" on some longer input to F ′ . Suppose L recursively b-stabilizes F and T is a text for L. Suppose j is as in the previous paragraph. As F is being fed successively longer initial segments of T , eventually σ j is reached. We also like to think about the changing σ i 's subsequently found, where i > j, as a flickering flame above σ j . Stability implies that, for infinitely many τ ⊂ T , the flame may die down to exactly the level of σ j itself; however, for all but finitely many τ ⊂ T , it does not dip below or destroy σ j . Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that L recursively b-stabilizes F. Then by Lemma 4.9,
(The algorithm for) F ′ on texts for L will eventually stabilize in its choice of D 1 , σ 1 to be the same for each T ′ for L: it will stabilize its choice of D 1 , σ 1 to be the least D, σ satisfying (5.2). This is since, for all but finitely many τ ⊂ T , τ and content(τ ) will be big enough to find counterexamples to all the finitely many has stabilized on a T for L, say, on all sufficiently large τ ⊂ T ; on such suitably large τ , the while loop eventually terminates with a final value for i, say i τ , which is ≤ b since card(D 1 ) ≤ b, and the while loop looks for proper subsets of the D i 's. Clearly, as above, on suitably large τ ⊂ T , there is a maximum i ≤ the while loop's i τ 's with D 1 , σ 1 , . . . , D i , σ i eventually stable, and, also clearly, this maximum i is independent of texts for L.
Claim 2. F ′ is weakly b-ary order independent. Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that T for L stabilizes F ′ . We need to show, then,
is a candidate for stability at the first level, so to speak. Since, by assumption just above, T does stabilize F ′ for some finite D, F ′ (T )⇓ = D, and then, since pad is one-to-one, the D 1 , σ 1 argument to it cannot take on infinitely many values as F ′ is fed T. Since F ′ can't jump back to rejected previous choices of D 1 , σ 1 , (the algorithm for) F ′ on T eventually finds a stable value for D 1 , σ 1 . Hence, by a simple restatement of the proof of Claim 1 above, there is a maximum i such that (the algorithm for) F ′ on T eventually has stable values for D 1 , σ 1 , . . . , D i , σ i , and the value of i is independent of texts for L. Let imax denote this maximum i. Hence,
This latter set of programs has cardinality ≤ b since D imax does. Therefore, F ′ is weakly b-ary order independent.
N.B.: There is no guarantee that (5.3) is an equality since we may have that, on some T for L, for all but finitely many τ ⊂ T , and for the corresponding σ iτ 's from the while loop, the programs pad(F(σ iτ ),
Suppose L recursively b-stabilizes F. Let imax be the maximum i from Claim 1 (independent of the choice of text for L). Let
Equivalently,
In that interest, suppose p ∈ D imax . We will show p ∈ D Rec . By the maximality of imax,
Hence, 
′ is a recursive text for L and T ′ = n∈N τ n too, with τ 0 ⊂ τ 1 ⊂ τ 2 ⊂ · · · . By the choice of τ n 's for each n ∈ N, F(τ n+1 ) = p. Hence, T ′ is a recursive text for
Clearly, L recursively b-stabilizes F. Therefore, by Claim 1, a maximum imax exists with eventually stable values for
imax independent of texts for L in the operation of (the algorithm for)
This ends the proof of Theorem 5.5. The next theorem (Theorem 5.6) implies that learning power for infinite r.e. languages (with respect to TxtFex a b -identification) is not decreased by restricting learning functions to be simultaneously (completely) set-driven and weakly b-ary order independent. Furthermore, it implies that one can also simultaneously circumvent the restriction to recursive texts.
Theorem 5.6. There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) a learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function F ′ such that 1. F ′ is both set-driven and weakly b-ary order independent, and
. Proof. Modify (the algorithm for) F ′ in the proof above of Theorem 5.5 by setting n = card(content(τ )) (instead of setting n = τ ). Since for infinite L this n grows, one can apply the rest of the proof of Theorem 5.5 mutatis mutandis. 26 Royer and Kurtz suggested to us that the use of set-driven learning functions could simplify the proof of at least a special case of Theorem 3.3 and Jun Tarui pointed out to us that weak b-ary order independence would further simplify proving Theorem 3.3. The proof herein of Theorem 3.3 makes use of Theorem 5.6. We believe it is not possible to replace weak b-ary order independence with bary order independence in Theorems 5.5 and 5.6, contrary to our slightly overzealous claims in [16] . However, we have the following result (Theorem 5.7) with Fulk (who is not responsible for the possibly incorrect claims in [16] ). Theorem 5.7 implies that learning power (with respect to TxtFex a b -identification) is not decreased by simultaneously restricting learning functions to be (fully) b-ary order independent and circumventing the restriction to recursive texts. It also implies that one can also simultaneously have a technical property we call determination by single text (part 2 of the theorem).
This theorem has application in [23] , and the (full) b-ary order independence is important for that application.
Theorem 5.7 (Case and Fulk).
There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function
. Proof. Suppose that F and b are given. The algorithm for F ′ is much like that in the proof of Theorem 5.5 above, with some exceptions as noted below. τ − is as defined in (3.1). In defining F ′ on τ , we assume we have iteratively (on successively larger τ ′ ⊂ τ ) kept a priority queue of programs/grammars, which queue is initially empty. Proceed initially as in the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 5.5 above, but if the value of D 1 , σ 1 associated with τ is = the value of D 1 , σ 1 associated with τ − , empty the priority queue, and output τ ; otherwise, continue down through the end of the while loop and then let
where, as in the proof of Theorem 5.5, i τ is the final value of i from the while loop for input τ . Next, in increasing order of σ ′ such that σ ′ in A, σ ′ ≤ n, and σ ′ ⊇ σ (σ from (5.6)), put F(σ ′ ) on the tail of the priority queue; when that is all done, output the front of the priority queue.
The outputting of τ upon witnessing an instability in the choice of D 1 , σ 1 is essentially a combinatorial device from [3] , and it plays the role that pad did in the proof of Theorem 5. We do not know if there are analogues of Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 above for TxtMfex a bidentification. The use of pad in the proofs of those theorems wreaks havoc with program/grammar size. However, we do have the next three theorems, the first of which has application in [23] .
These theorems say that we can have, for TxtMfex a b -identification, without loss of learning power, either 1. b-ary order independence, determination by single text, and circumvention of the restriction to recursive texts (Theorem 5.8); 2. partly set-driven learning functions and circumvention of the restriction to recursive texts (Theorem 5.9); or 3. (completely) set-driven learning functions and circumvention of the restriction to recursive texts (Theorem 5.10), but this latter conjunction is guaranteed for infinite languages only. Theorem 5.8 (Case and Jain). There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) a learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5.7 suffices mutatis mutandis. The next theorem was independently noticed by Jain. Theorem 5.9 (Case and Jain). There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) a learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function F ′ such that 1. F ′ is partly set-driven, and
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5.5 above with the elimination of any mention of pad and weak b-ary order independence, mutatis mutandis, suffices to prove the present theorem.
Similarly, the proof of Theorem 5.6 above may be modified along the lines suggested in the proof of Theorem 5.9 to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.10. There is an algorithm for transforming any b and (an algorithm for) a learning function F into a corresponding (algorithm for a) learning function F ′ such that 1. F ′ is set-driven, and
. We expect that the theorems of this section will be generally useful for work in the area.
6. Proofs deferred from section 3. In section 3 we deferred proofs of three results until we had the benefit of some of the concepts and/or results from sections 4 and 5. The present section contains those deferred proofs and, for convenience, we restate each result being proved.
Clearly, the second conclusion of Theorem 5.5 and the third conclusion of Theorem 5.8 yield the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1.
As we noted in section 3, the proof of the next theorem depends, in part, on Definitions 5.1 and 5.4 and Theorem 5.6.
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Suppose for contradiction that F TxtFex * n -identifies L n+1 . Each member of L n+1 is infinite; hence, thanks to Theorem 5.6, we may suppose, without loss of generality, that F is set-driven and weakly n-ary order independent. Therefore, in particular, we may write F(D) for F(σ), where D = content(σ). By implicit application of a padded version of the n + 1-ary recursion theorem there are distinct self-other referentials e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n defining W e0 , W e1 , . . . , W en , respectively, in successive stages s as follows.
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For each i ≤ n, let W ei,s = the finitely much of W ei defined before stage s described below; also set W ei,0 = ∅. Go to stage 0. 
. Let W ei,s be an increasing order enumeration of W ei,s . Hence, W ei,s is also a finite initial segment of a text. Let T i = W ei,s0 ⋄ W ei,s1 ⋄ W ei,s2 ⋄ · · · . Clearly T i is a text for W ei , which equals W e0 . Since F is weakly n-ary order independent, there is a set D of cardinality ≤ n such that
However, since this is Case 2 and by the choice of s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , the left-hand side of (6.1) has cardinality > n, a contradiction.
As we noted in section 3 above, the proof of the next theorem depends on Theorem 4.4.
Proof. This proof employs previously unpublished techniques used to prove a similar result for TxtFex a 1 in [28] . Suppose that F TxtFex 2m * -identifies L. We will construct an F ′ which TxtBc midentifies L, and then it will suffice to prove the furthermore clause.
Define F ′ on τ thus. First calculate p = F(τ ). By Kleene's S-m-n theorem [82] , find p τ such that W pτ = ((W p ∪ content(τ ))− the m least numbers not in content(τ )).
. For all sufficiently large τ ∈ T , p = F(τ ) ∈ D and p τ patches any mistakes of omission of p; furthermore, p τ removes m elements, including up to m of the mistakes of commission of p (if any) and, perhaps in the process, it creates new mistakes of omission.
Case 1. The number of mistakes of commission in such a p is ≥ m. Of course this number of mistakes is ≤ 2m. Then p τ removes m of these mistakes of commission leaving a residue of ≤ m errors.
Case 2. The number m ′ of mistakes of commission in such a p is < m. Then p τ removes all these errors of commission, but creates m − m ′ new errors (of omission); however, this number is still ≤ m.
In each case, for such p, p τ has ≤ m errors. Therefore,
. Suppose for contradiction that L ∈ TxtBc m as witnessed by learning function F. Hence, in particular, F TxtBc m -identifies N. Therefore, by Theorem 4.4,
7. Concluding remarks. In this section we discuss briefly computable universe hypotheses, present some critical discussion about the applicability to human language learning of Gold-style models and our main theorem (Theorem 3.3 above), and sketch some areas for future investigation.
We have considered (among other possibilities) computable models of learning on computable data sequences. The whole universe or humanly significant portions of it may be computable and/or discrete. Such possibilities are taken seriously-for example, in [99, 92, 91, 34, 17, 15, 29] . In a discrete, random universe with only computable probability distributions for its behavior (e.g., a discrete, quantum mechanical universe), the expected behavior will still be computable [32, 42, 43] . 29 In such a universe any beings (e.g., humans) who have cognition, including language learning and scientific induction, will be subject to the constraint that at least their expected behavior will be computable; hence, any theorems about computable learning agents will inform us, to some extent, of the possible behaviors of those beings. It would appear that human genetic programs make use of error correction in an attempt to circumvent "random" influences, including those from the quantum mechanical level. It is plausible that human cognitive programs built on top of the wetware the genetic programs partly construct do likewise. Hence, computability of cognition may be a pretty good model.
Even if cognition is computable (although perhaps too complicated for mere humans to figure out how it's done), there are still problems realistically modeling human language learning with Gold's paradigm. References [58, 59] present empirical evidence that semantics in addition to positive information may be essential to human language learning. It seems clear that denotation and social reinforcers play crucial roles in the human case, but not in Gold's paradigm. In [15] the report on Chapter 6 of [38] is partly motivated by treating negative information as a more mathematically tractable possible substitute for semantic information. Reference [61] notes that in homes where parents do supply improvements to child utterances (a subtle form of correction or negative information), there is increased speed of language acquisition. It is not clear if the relation is causal, but Theorem 22 in [5] implies there are cases where a significant improvement in language learning speed (as calibrated by the number of mind-changes required to reach a single final correct grammar) results from the presence of minimal negative information. Largely unexplored, but of some interest, is the extension of [5] to TxtFex a b -identification. We originally suggested in [16] on the basis of our main corollary (Corollary 3.7 to Theorem 3.3) that Gold's model be extended to embrace the success criteria TxtFex a b 29 Sources such as [73, 74] , sadly, seem to have overlooked the important result in [32] that the expected input/output behavior of a Turing machine with random oracle subject to a computable probability distribution is computable (and constructively so).
for "small" values of a and b. We consider next a possible difficulty. In the proof of Theorem 3.3, for each F, the associated set(s) W e0 , W e1 , . . . , W en may, in some cases, differ considerably in computational complexity from one another, and Osherson pointed out to us that there is no apparent corresponding vacillation in human language performance. However, in the proof of Theorem 3.3, for each F, the associated set(s) W e0 , W e1 , . . . , W en are each actually recursive; hence, for each F, there is a Blum complexity measure Φ [10, 48] such that Φ e0 = Φ e1 = · · · = Φ en ; therefore, if performance were measured by such a Φ, vacillatory learning would increase learning power but without a corresponding vacillation in performance. Technical questions remain open regarding which stronger quantificational variants of the argument in the previous sentence can be made. In another direction, we note that the proof of Theorem 3.3 permits a modification so that the relative density of output of all the final programs/grammars but one is as small as we like. Hence, the performance vacillation may exist, but significant degradations in articulateness potential might be confined to rare episodes. Even if such episodes do not exist for humans, they might be tolerated in an artificial system.
In spite of the limitations to date of modeling human language learning with (extensions of) Gold's paradigm, we believe that many of the theorems (e.g., Theorem 4.4) in this area nonetheless give some insights. The state of the art is weakly analogous to modeling the thermodynamics of fluids without taking into account van der Waal's forces: one may still get some understanding of the reality so modeled.
Speaking of Theorem 4.4, it would be mathematically interesting to explore what happens to the subset principle for TxtBc-identification restricted to recursive texts.
It is interesting to place further feasibility restrictions on the criteria of success. As noted in section 5 above, [23] studies TxtMfex a b -identification, the restricted variant of TxtFex a b -identification which requires that final programs/grammars be nearly minimal size. For language learning, bounding complexity of learning machines as in [33] or [24] remains to be explored. Translating relative solvability results into relative feasibility results, as in [97] , would be very interesting to pursue in the context of the present paper. In section 5 there are several results about no loss of learning power in passing from some learning function F to an insensitive or restricted learning function F ′ . How does the complexity of such F ′ 's compare to that of F? If the complexity of F ′ in some cases must be significantly greater than that of F, then one could plausibly conjecture that child language learning is highly sensitive to the order of data presentation.
Can we get versions of our separation results robust in the sense of [40] ? Much of the work in Gold-style learning theory on success criteria extending Gold's is motivated by attempts to assuage the negative results in this area. Reference [53] mentions a common argument to the effect that very strong negative results about language learnability in [46] provide evidence that human language learning must involve some innately stored information! The negative results suggest, among other things, that 1. general purpose learning is not possible, and 2. alleged human general purpose learning is an illusion brought about by our having innate information stored for a large and varied collection of domains [41, 89] . In the practical context of robot planning, McDermott [60] says, "Learning makes the most sense when it is thought of as filling in the details in an algorithm that is already nearly right." In the context of function learning, [27] provides several models of learning from examples together with approximately correct programs. Included are models in which the maximal probability of learning all the computable functions is proportional to how tightly the approximately correct programs envelope the data. Unexplored, but very interesting, is how to provide such models for language learning from positive data. Success might provide some insight into the form of innate knowledge for human language learning.
